http://republicofotters.blogspot.com/2018/05/idealism-cynicism-and-being-paranoid.html
Batman genius or guano loco genius?
Batman genius or guano loco genius?
Throughout his life, Sima Yi had accomplished plenty of military victories. In fact, he was later given the authority to command the army within the capital. Below were some of his Batman moments.
1. Kill Meng Da
Not to be confused with Kill Bill, Kill Meng Da was a story of how a vital disregard for the SOP could save a nation. When Cao Cao was still alive, he viewed Meng Da as an important talent. Once it came to Cao Rui, things changed. Meng Da felt like some kind of persona non grata and things began to kick into gear. Because war is all about the options available and not about morals, Zhuge Liang decided to form a temporary alliance with Meng Da. This was despite repeated warnings that Meng Da was untrustworthy. One would attack from outside, the other attacking from within. Going by the Batman gambit rule, Meng Da was confident that Sima Yi wouldn't arrive that fast. The only problem? Sima Yi just threw the SOP out of the window.
Deng Xian: You sure that Sima Yi won't be coming?
Meng Da: He has no choice but to obey the protocol. He can't just say *bleep* the SOP. I don't care whether his tigress wife is in charge of the SOP. He will need around a month to gain permission to mobilise the troops.
Deng Xian: Erm, uncle. There's a reason why I asked this question.
Meng Da: It's a stupid question.
Deng Xian: No, it's not. You better go take a look who's currently downstairs waiting for... you, I guess.
So how did Sima Yi's Batman gambit work? He was able to predict what Meng Da was thinking when he decided to stage an uprising via his territory at Xincheng. On one hand, Sima Yi had to contend with the unwanted baggage of being untrustworthy. Yes, Cao Pi trusted him. But no, Cao Cao didn't. If Sima Yi was to throw the SOP out of the window, that'd create trouble for himself. After all, Cao Rui had just assumed power and anything could happen. Those who know how it felt to be fall guy/girl should be able to understand what happened when people don't trust you. Either they would ignore you or jump on you. If this sounds familiar, that's because I have a history of being a schoolyard bullying victim. Sima Yi knew it as well. The only problem? Meng Da underestimated Cao Rui's distrust towards him. That's where Sima Yi exploited the situation. If quashing the rebellion failed, there's a 50-50 chance of Sima Yi getting away because Meng Da was effectively isolated in the Wei royal court. If it's a success, Sima Yi would be called a hero.
On the other hand, quashing the rebellion had to be done asap. Given a foolproof chance, Meng Da would surely rebel. Yet, it must be pointed out that the reason why Sima Yi knew about the deal was due to a leaker named Shen Yi. Once Zhongda understood what's going on, he did that one vital preparation sealing Meng Da's fate. And that's to play mind games.
By sending letters to Meng Da, Sima Yi wasn't interested in playing it nice. Rather, it was meant to make the opponent hesitate. Eventually, the same guy would still rebel. Given a choice between a second chance or remaining as a persona non grata, it's very easy for Sima Yi to guess Meng Da's final decision. At the same time, Zhuge Liang would also be sending more letters to further convince Meng Da in... well, re-defecting. Meng Da was only interested in personal gain. The rest could burn in hell for all he cared. Cao Rui would represent a poorer bet compared to Zhuge Liang and Sima Yi used this mentality against Meng Da. Coupled with ignoring the SOP, he was able to stage a surprise siege on Xincheng. People tend to do all sorts of stuff once in hysteria mode. The Salem witch trials proved this to be very true. Sima Yi was merely doing the same thing. It's not really that hard if you're to consider the fact that no real efforts were made during the eight-day period.
By sending letters to Meng Da, Sima Yi wasn't interested in playing it nice. Rather, it was meant to make the opponent hesitate. Eventually, the same guy would still rebel. Given a choice between a second chance or remaining as a persona non grata, it's very easy for Sima Yi to guess Meng Da's final decision. At the same time, Zhuge Liang would also be sending more letters to further convince Meng Da in... well, re-defecting. Meng Da was only interested in personal gain. The rest could burn in hell for all he cared. Cao Rui would represent a poorer bet compared to Zhuge Liang and Sima Yi used this mentality against Meng Da. Coupled with ignoring the SOP, he was able to stage a surprise siege on Xincheng. People tend to do all sorts of stuff once in hysteria mode. The Salem witch trials proved this to be very true. Sima Yi was merely doing the same thing. It's not really that hard if you're to consider the fact that no real efforts were made during the eight-day period.
Verdict and outcome:
It's like trying to understand whether the Libyan model would really work on North Korea. Gaddafi was effectively another Meng Da because he didn't have China. Kim Jong-un won't end up like Meng Da because he has that one friend Gaddafi didn't have. Again, it's China. Trust me when I say China has the bigger stick compared to the U.S when it comes to disciplinary action.
Winner
2, Born in the year of the dog
It's official. After that fateful interview involving a problematic boss and an equally problematic employee (not to mention the 180 degrees part), Sima Yi had no choice but to protect himself. And how did he protect himself? You don't have to be born in the year of the dog to act like a dog. Even if you act like a dog, it doesn't make you any less human. Trust me, I was treated like a dog from Henderson Primary School to Gan Eng Seng School (because there's no primary school version in the 90s) to ITE Dover to my NSF days at 32 SIB. And it got nothing to do with the fact that I was born in the year of the dog. This is not to say that everyone was guilty of wearing the same mask. There were nice people here and there (Ms Komala of 32 SIB, I still remember you, believe it or not). Unfortunately, it took more than just a few nice people to heal a broken person.
[帝于是勤于吏职，夜以忘寝，至于刍牧之间，悉皆临履，由是魏武意遂安。]
Above sentence indicated that in order to live peacefully instead of getting another tangkap threat, Sima Yi had no choice but to choose the most Singaporean way to live. Namely, work, work, and overwork. Under normal circumstances, there's only this much the human body can take before shutting down when it comes to working. That's why people in certain countries like Singapore, Japan, and South Korea are susceptible to dying young. And I'm not talking about biathlons and triathlons. In order to live, Sima Yi had no choice but to risk death by being the typical Singaporean/Japanese/South Korean.
Verdict and outcome:
To act dumb is to be smart. To act smart is to be dumb. Maybe that's why smarter kids have a higher chance of being bullied from Henderson Primary School to Gan Eng Seng School to ITE Dover. Either you're too smart to be ignored or people mistook you for a spastic kid. As for Zhongda, he disguised himself as a dog in order to survive like a wolf.
Winner
3. The wolf was smarter than the dragon because elitism is a lie.
[先是，亮使至，帝问曰：“诸葛公起居何如，食可几米？” 对曰：“三四升。” 次问政事，曰：“二十罚已上皆自省览。” 帝既而告人曰：“诸葛孔明其能久乎！”]
Okay, it's not really that. The wolf wasn't smarter than the dragon. Just that the dragon was a master of organising things to manipulate the situation (which was proven beyond doubt via the Longzhong strategy and his ability to boss an army) while the wolf was a master of turning opportunism into momentum (I'll come to that later). You can't say Superman is weaker than Batman, but I think Batman actually won.
Above scene was during the Battle of Wuzhang Plains where Zhuge Liang would eventually die like a Singaporean/Japanese/South Korean. Give credit where it's due, Zhuge Liang was the upright guy. That's why he's still such a widely admired cultural icon in China and beyond (although we also have to thank Luo Guanzhong as well for his #fakenews otherwise known as The Romance of the Three Kingdoms). But Zhuge Liang wasn't God. He couldn't prevent things going downhill after the fiasco at Jieting. Granted he was to blame for this. He should have placed Wang Ping and Zhao Yun as the chief commanders with Ma Su and Deng Zhi as the second in command. He did the reverse and that's how his northern campaign failed. His first failure would result in the other battles either lost or yielding less than what was desired. After all, there were only three paths linking his backyard to Cao Wei's backyard. With one gate shut, it's actually very easy for the opposition to guard the remaining two (i.e. Chencang and the route along the Han River).
Zhongda: So how's Mr Zhuge? How much carbohydrate has he taken?
Kongming's envoy: Three to four sheng.
Zhongda *thinking to himself*: Okay, that's natural.
Zhongda: So how's Mr Zhuge? How does he spend his day?
Kongming's envoy: He has already recorded twenty minor punishments in the catalogue.
After the envoy left...
Zhongda: Men, guys, and people... Zhuge Kongming is going to die very soon.
How does one translate the term "二十罚已上皆自省览"? Wikipedia has its... well, own explanation. I tried to do my own explanation, I'm not sure how accurate it is. Either way, Zhongda should have a very good knowledge of Kongming at that time. After Cao Zhen passed away, Sima Yi became the Chief of Army. Much earlier on, a certain Shu Han talent called Huang Quan defected to Cao Wei. Poor Gongheng had nowhere to go after Liu Bei suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Lu Xun. He couldn't defect to Wu, he could only defect to Wei (note that Liu Bei stationed him at Jiangbei, which was effectively the porch to the Wei portion of Jing Province). It could be at this time where Sima Yi started knowing about his once and future opponent. One can only imagine how insane Zhongda's memory level was. It's like remembering pointless things happening between 2012 and 2013... oh, that's me. Not Zhongda.
Note: Above story is a true story. Seriously, it's true. But I think Ryan and Patrick have forgotten about it.
Fast forward to the Battle of Wuzhang Plains and it's safe to say that Zhongda allowed Kongming to self-destruct. The only problem? Zhongda wasn't God, he couldn't predict when Kongming would fulfil that death "prophecy". It's like Guo Jia doing the same thing concerning Sun Ce. They're going to die anyway, but the important question is when?
3-4 sheng of rice was actually the standard for a normal human being's dietary intake. I got the info from the internet so you may need to double confirm with any of your dietician friends or anyone currently working in the field of nutritional science.
To perform the natural extent of tasks given, natural intake is a must. When it comes to the unnatural extent of tasks given, unnatural intake is a must. More things to do must eat more. It's not just the physical because your brain needs proper nutrition to function normally.
Verdict and outcome:
Kongming's willpower was anti-human in nature, but Zhongda sensed something else apart from death via overwork: The enemy was running low on food supplies. No one told him that. But the ability to connect the dots instead of just looking at the dots enabled him to know things which others were unable to perceive. In this case, it's connecting Zhuge Liang's way of doing things to the need for higher nutritional intake (i.e. Sima Yi most likely assumed Zhuge Liang would need more than just 3-4 shengs of rice). It's like asking me whether North Korea will keep its nukes. I doubt so. Claudia Kim has got no choice but to denuke. Pyongyang's situation is definitely stickier than Kongming's scenario. Remember what I said about China having the bigger stick than the U.S? I hope this doesn't sound too Batman'esque.
Winner
3. Counter-intuition: The path to critical thinking
People enjoy laughing at us Singaporeans. They say we're so intelligent, we actually lost the ability to think critically. To think out of the box is to go against the crowd. I'm not saying rebel for the sake of rebelling. What I mean is this: Don't overrate the intuitive approach, value what is counter-intuitive.
[七年春正月，吴寇柤中，夷夏万馀家避寇北渡沔。帝以沔南近贼，若百姓奔还，必复致寇，宜权留之。曹爽曰：“今不能修守沔南而留百姓，非长策也。” 帝曰：“不然。凡物致之安地则安，危地则危。故兵书曰‘成败，形也；安危，势也’。形势，御众之要，不可以不审。设令贼以二万人断沔水，三万人与沔南诸军相持，万人陆梁柤中，将何以救之？” 爽不从，卒令还南。贼果袭破柤中，所失万计。]
The Wu forces were invading again. The people were forced to flee. And we got two fellows debating what to do. You have Cao Shuang, he's ancient China's equivalent of an MP's kid. Then you have the persona non grata of the moment, Sima Zhongda.
Cao Shuang suggested hitting a retreat. After all, the enemy was nearing [曹爽曰：“今不能修守沔南而留百姓，非长策也。”].
Sima Yi played the no-man, he pointed out the people were nearing Mian'nan, where the good guys were being stationed. If the good guys retreat, they lose. The good guys must stay and fortify. If not, the folks would just run back and raise the white flag. That'd be disastrous, that's Sima Yi's logic [帝以沔南近贼，若百姓奔还，必复致寇，宜权留之。]. Suffice to say, the enemy was running on a high momentum. Cao Shuang was only intelligent enough to see the momentum, but Sima Yi was smart enough to understand the momentum. Seeing and understanding are two different things together. Any teacher disagreeing with me deserves to be fired, any parent disagreeing with me is... well, dumb.
Zhongda's logic was this: Things that reached places of safety would be safe while those reaching places of danger would be endangered. Victory and defeat depend on the situation, safety and danger depend on the momentum. To command the soldiers, one must analyse both [凡物致之安地则安，危地则危。故兵书曰‘成败，形也；安危，势也’。形势，御众之要，不可以不审。]. You can't have victory without safety or the risk of defeat without danger. During 2016, the media made a fatal mistake. They could analyse the situation, but they couldn't analyse the momentum. As a result, everyone apart from Republican voters were shocked to see the GOP winning the popular votes for the Congress seats (ironically, Hillary Clinton also won the popular votes. Just that the electors didn't seem to like her for some reason). To be fair, though, I also thought the Democrats would take the nation by a storm of blue.
[设令贼以二万人断沔水，三万人与沔南诸军相持，万人陆梁柤中，将何以救之？]
Sima Yi was making a logical hypothesis here. If the enemy occupied the Mian River with 20K men, 30K men going up against the defensive forces at Mian'nan, and 10K men attacking Zhazhong, how can the good guys win? It's quite likely that the good guys were not just stationed at Mian'nan, but rather deployed in the surrounding region as well. Hence, Cao Shuang's decision to retreat back to Mian'nan itself. No prizes for guessing correctly that the good guys lost it. Badly [爽不从，卒令还南。贼果袭破柤中，所失万计。].
Verdict and outcome:
Cao Shuang's error reflected that of the political pundits during the 2016 elections. While they guessed correctly that Clinton would win the people's votes, they guessed wrongly that the Democrats would avenge the humiliation Obama suffered from 2010 till the end of his tenure. Which now comes to the most interesting question: Where will the swing voters momentum go this year? Will it be away from the alt-right Trumpocalypse or they be running away from the far-left deep state? I won't be surprised if the swing voters will only end up running in one direction instead of splitting up like Harry "the shota style" Styles and Taylor "will she be N time lucky?" Swift.
Needless to say, the need to strike a balance between knowing the situation and momentum is key to understanding instead of just seeing. That's how Batman is able to maximise his gambit. By my guess, that is.
[今悬军远征，将谓不能持久，必先距辽水而后守]
[He is certain to offer resistance on the Liao River first and defend Xiangping afterwards...]
This was Sima Yi channelling his inner Batman once again. Gongsun Yuan knew the enemy forces would have to travel a long distance to fight a war. Hence, he would surely hold fort at the River Liao to assume a defensive approach. And guess what? Zhongda allowed this guy to have his way. Why?
Because... Sima Yi was Batman.
[惟明者能深度彼己，豫有所弃，此非其所及也]
[Only a man of insight and wisdom is able to weigh his own and the enemy's relative strength, and so give up something beforehand. But this is not something Gongsun Yuan can do]
Taking down Xiangping would mean nothing if the Wei forces got themselves hemmed in as a result. Hence, Sima Yi's damning verdict on his opponent.
The battle was effectively done in three stages.
Stage one would be preparation.
[往百日，还百日，攻百日，以六十日为休息，一年足矣]
[A hundred days for going, another hundred days for the attack, still another hundred days for coming back, and sixty days for rest; thus one year is sufficient]
Above statement was Cao Rui asking Sima Yi how long it would take for the army to be mobilised. One year would be all it took for the battle to end.
100 days for going: This refers to the forces moving forward from the base to attack the enemy.
100 days for coming back: This refers to the amount of time for the forces to return back to the base.
100 days for the attack: This refers to the amount of time needed to end the fight.
60 days of rest: This was to ensure the soldiers had enough time to rest.
The problem being faced by the Wei forces was losing the fight of attrition. The reason why Gongsun Yuan was able to be so arrogant for quite some time was due to Cao Wei's unsuccessful attempt to take down the enemy through this method. In war, the defending party would have the advantage, not the attacking army. Defending the ground requires a lesser amount of troops compared to those attacking the ground. The familiarity of terrain and military discipline are what make this possible. This also explained why Sima Yi was able to predict what Gongsun Yuan would do. Effectively speaking, one can say Sima Yi knew Gongsun Yuan would self-destruct due to the victories he had so far. The entire order of preparation should look something like this: 60 days of rest>100 days of travelling>100 days of fighting>100 days for coming back.
Stage two would be engaging the enemy. In the first phase, Sima Yi planted many flags and banners south of River Liao (note that the enemy was encamped at the northern end). This was to draw the enemy's sight towards the dummy force. In the second phase, the main army led by Sima Yi crossed the river to the northern side. Then the next thing his men realised, Sima Yi commanded the boats to be burnt and barricades to be built around the bank. By right, the enemy should be able to see the barricades being built. By wrong, they never realised the other enemy force across the river was a dummy army. Simply put, no one in his right mind would try to attack the so-called smaller army. Quite obviously, Sima Yi's generals thought their boss might have gone barking mad like a mad dog. The reason why being that Sima Yi decided to move ahead towards Xiangping instead of staying put.
Sima Yi reasoned that Gongsun Yuan was hell-bent on overpowering them. Hence, fighting a war of attrition would be what the enemy wanted [贼坚营高垒，欲以老吾兵也。攻之，正入其计]. The word 老 in this context is a euphemism for dead. In fact, the Liaodong force running out to meet them was as large as a few ten thousand strong in a bid to prevent Sima Yi's army from progressing [文懿果遣步骑数万，阻辽隧，坚壁而守，南北六七十里，以距帝].
Secondly, if he was to attack Xiangping straightaway, the Liaodong army would be alerted and stage a fightback as a result. This was due to a combination of Xiangping having only minimum security and how panic could easily result in a backlash (that's so long inner turmoil wasn't there). In this situation, the Wei army would be defeated [贼大众在此，则巢窟虚矣。我直指襄平，则人怀内惧，惧而求战，破之必矣]. Because haste was of the utmost importance for Sima Yi (i.e. 100 days to travel from the south to somewhere near Korea), it's very likely that he was, in fact, leading an army of a lesser number. Interestingly enough, Sima Yi only entered the fray in the latter half of the war. In other words, previous failures would have given him an idea of how many men Gongsun Wenyi had at his disposal.
Then came the best part of stage two: [遂整阵而过。贼见兵出其后，果邀之。帝谓诸将曰：“所以不攻其营，正欲致此，不可失也。”乃纵兵逆击，大破之，三战皆捷。贼保襄平，进军围之。]
Sneak behind the enemy, expose yourself, enemy attacks. Then you fight back in the most epic manner ever. With the river effectively becoming the Liaodong forces dead end, Sima Yi secured a crushing victory. Remember, this current army had rested enough. At the same time, a lesser quantity means better quality when it comes to war. Gongsun Yuan might have the quantity, but Sima Yi got the quality. And that's not considering the dummy army at the south blowing horns and making all sorts of noise to further destabilise the Liaodong troops. The historical text never mentioned it, but it should be tactical common sense. Really. A little wonder why Sun Quan wrote in his final (?) letter to Gongsun Yuan that Sima Yi was some sort of military god capable of unpredictable moves [初，文懿闻魏师之出也，请救于孙权。权亦出兵遥为之声援，遗文懿书曰：“司马公善用兵，变化若神，所向无前，深为弟忧之。”].
The third part would be the decisive stage. Erm, there's a problem, though.
Subordinate: Boss, we got a problem here.
Zhongda: What? Please don't tell me it's that tigress again.
Subordinate: I'm afraid it's worse than your tigress. The climate is *bleep*ing up the progress. The water level is rising and the generals are talking about moving camp.
Zhongda: Just proceed, don't slow down. If anyone makes any noise, I'll just execute them like a boss. Because I am the boss here.
Seriously, the Wei troops were in a panic. The water level was rising and you can't blame them for worrying whether progress would be halted because of the climate change. A high ranking general acted against orders, Sima Yi executed him like a boss [都督令史张静犯令，斩之，军中乃定]. And because he proved himself to be the real boss of the battlefield, everyone else had no choice but to...
Sima Yi played the no-man, he pointed out the people were nearing Mian'nan, where the good guys were being stationed. If the good guys retreat, they lose. The good guys must stay and fortify. If not, the folks would just run back and raise the white flag. That'd be disastrous, that's Sima Yi's logic [帝以沔南近贼，若百姓奔还，必复致寇，宜权留之。]. Suffice to say, the enemy was running on a high momentum. Cao Shuang was only intelligent enough to see the momentum, but Sima Yi was smart enough to understand the momentum. Seeing and understanding are two different things together. Any teacher disagreeing with me deserves to be fired, any parent disagreeing with me is... well, dumb.
Zhongda's logic was this: Things that reached places of safety would be safe while those reaching places of danger would be endangered. Victory and defeat depend on the situation, safety and danger depend on the momentum. To command the soldiers, one must analyse both [凡物致之安地则安，危地则危。故兵书曰‘成败，形也；安危，势也’。形势，御众之要，不可以不审。]. You can't have victory without safety or the risk of defeat without danger. During 2016, the media made a fatal mistake. They could analyse the situation, but they couldn't analyse the momentum. As a result, everyone apart from Republican voters were shocked to see the GOP winning the popular votes for the Congress seats (ironically, Hillary Clinton also won the popular votes. Just that the electors didn't seem to like her for some reason). To be fair, though, I also thought the Democrats would take the nation by a storm of blue.
[设令贼以二万人断沔水，三万人与沔南诸军相持，万人陆梁柤中，将何以救之？]
Sima Yi was making a logical hypothesis here. If the enemy occupied the Mian River with 20K men, 30K men going up against the defensive forces at Mian'nan, and 10K men attacking Zhazhong, how can the good guys win? It's quite likely that the good guys were not just stationed at Mian'nan, but rather deployed in the surrounding region as well. Hence, Cao Shuang's decision to retreat back to Mian'nan itself. No prizes for guessing correctly that the good guys lost it. Badly [爽不从，卒令还南。贼果袭破柤中，所失万计。].
Verdict and outcome:
Cao Shuang's error reflected that of the political pundits during the 2016 elections. While they guessed correctly that Clinton would win the people's votes, they guessed wrongly that the Democrats would avenge the humiliation Obama suffered from 2010 till the end of his tenure. Which now comes to the most interesting question: Where will the swing voters momentum go this year? Will it be away from the alt-right Trumpocalypse or they be running away from the far-left deep state? I won't be surprised if the swing voters will only end up running in one direction instead of splitting up like Harry "the shota style" Styles and Taylor "will she be N time lucky?" Swift.
Needless to say, the need to strike a balance between knowing the situation and momentum is key to understanding instead of just seeing. That's how Batman is able to maximise his gambit. By my guess, that is.
Winner
4. All your base are belong to us
The end was nigh, the enemy readying their arms. A usurper declared himself a king, his intent nothing less than taking over the entire kingdom. For he was never a satisfied man.
This is my retelling of history, nothing to do with the alt-right or far left. Gongsun Yuan, styled Wenyi [公孙渊，字文懿]. He's no Don T, he's unrelated to Hill Clinton. But he's definitely a deplorable crook. Long story short, he declared independence. He lobbied for Sun Quan's support and he got it. Cao Wei was in trouble. Liaodong was effectively the gateway between China and the Korean Peninsula. To have a foreigner declaring a state of belligerence was very likely the last thing the Koreans ever wanted to see. This was all about national security, not monocultural racism. I need to finish this post asap, so I'll dive straight into the Batman tactic.
[“弃城预走，上计也。据辽水以距大军，次计也。坐守襄平，此成擒耳。...惟明者能深度彼己，豫有所弃，此非其所及也。今悬军远征，将谓不能持久，必先距辽水而后守，此中下计也。...往百日，还百日，攻百日，以六十日为休息，一年足矣。”]
Translate: To leave his walls behind and take to flight would be the best plan for Gongsun Yuan. To take his position in Liaodong and resist our large forces would be the next best. But if he stays in Xiangping and defends it, he will be captured... Only a man of insight and wisdom is able to weigh his own and the enemy's relative strength, and so give up something beforehand. But this is not something Gongsun Yuan can do. On the contrary, he will think that our army, alone and on a long-distance expedition, cannot long keep it up. He is certain to offer resistance on the Liao River first and defend Xiangping afterwards... A hundred days for going, another hundred days for the attack, still another hundred days for coming back, and sixty days for rest; thus one year is sufficient.
Credit: Wikipedia
Translate: To leave his walls behind and take to flight would be the best plan for Gongsun Yuan. To take his position in Liaodong and resist our large forces would be the next best. But if he stays in Xiangping and defends it, he will be captured... Only a man of insight and wisdom is able to weigh his own and the enemy's relative strength, and so give up something beforehand. But this is not something Gongsun Yuan can do. On the contrary, he will think that our army, alone and on a long-distance expedition, cannot long keep it up. He is certain to offer resistance on the Liao River first and defend Xiangping afterwards... A hundred days for going, another hundred days for the attack, still another hundred days for coming back, and sixty days for rest; thus one year is sufficient.
Credit: Wikipedia
First, let's see how Zhongda tried seeing things from Wenyi's point of view.
[弃城预走，上计也。据辽水以距大军，次计也。坐守襄平，此成擒耳]
[To leave his walls behind and take to flight would be the best plan for Gongsun Yuan. To take his position in Liaodong and resist our large forces would be the next best. But if he stays in Xiangping and defends it, he will be captured]
[To leave his walls behind and take to flight would be the best plan for Gongsun Yuan. To take his position in Liaodong and resist our large forces would be the next best. But if he stays in Xiangping and defends it, he will be captured]
Gongsun Yuan was currently camped at Xiangping. If he decided to retreat in advance, he'd have secured an advantage. By retreating further inward, it'd make pursuit all the harder for Sima Yi and defending all the easier for the opponent.
[据辽水以距大军，次计也]
[To take his position in Liaodong and resist our large forces would be the next best.]
[To take his position in Liaodong and resist our large forces would be the next best.]
This indicated the second best approach for Wenyi. Hog the river bank in order to hold back the enemy. This would be the most sensible tactic in the eyes of a commander. So long there's a river separating two forces, the Liaodong faction would be at a defensive advantage. Hence...
[坐守襄平，此成擒耳]
[Hold fort at Xiangping? But if he stays in Xiangping and defends it, he will be captured...]
That one confirm kenna tangkap and mati liao...
[Hold fort at Xiangping? But if he stays in Xiangping and defends it, he will be captured...]
That one confirm kenna tangkap and mati liao...
[今悬军远征，将谓不能持久，必先距辽水而后守]
[He is certain to offer resistance on the Liao River first and defend Xiangping afterwards...]
This was Sima Yi channelling his inner Batman once again. Gongsun Yuan knew the enemy forces would have to travel a long distance to fight a war. Hence, he would surely hold fort at the River Liao to assume a defensive approach. And guess what? Zhongda allowed this guy to have his way. Why?
Because... Sima Yi was Batman.
[惟明者能深度彼己，豫有所弃，此非其所及也]
[Only a man of insight and wisdom is able to weigh his own and the enemy's relative strength, and so give up something beforehand. But this is not something Gongsun Yuan can do]
Taking down Xiangping would mean nothing if the Wei forces got themselves hemmed in as a result. Hence, Sima Yi's damning verdict on his opponent.
The battle was effectively done in three stages.
Stage one would be preparation.
[往百日，还百日，攻百日，以六十日为休息，一年足矣]
[A hundred days for going, another hundred days for the attack, still another hundred days for coming back, and sixty days for rest; thus one year is sufficient]
Above statement was Cao Rui asking Sima Yi how long it would take for the army to be mobilised. One year would be all it took for the battle to end.
100 days for going: This refers to the forces moving forward from the base to attack the enemy.
100 days for coming back: This refers to the amount of time for the forces to return back to the base.
100 days for the attack: This refers to the amount of time needed to end the fight.
60 days of rest: This was to ensure the soldiers had enough time to rest.
The problem being faced by the Wei forces was losing the fight of attrition. The reason why Gongsun Yuan was able to be so arrogant for quite some time was due to Cao Wei's unsuccessful attempt to take down the enemy through this method. In war, the defending party would have the advantage, not the attacking army. Defending the ground requires a lesser amount of troops compared to those attacking the ground. The familiarity of terrain and military discipline are what make this possible. This also explained why Sima Yi was able to predict what Gongsun Yuan would do. Effectively speaking, one can say Sima Yi knew Gongsun Yuan would self-destruct due to the victories he had so far. The entire order of preparation should look something like this: 60 days of rest>100 days of travelling>100 days of fighting>100 days for coming back.
Stage two would be engaging the enemy. In the first phase, Sima Yi planted many flags and banners south of River Liao (note that the enemy was encamped at the northern end). This was to draw the enemy's sight towards the dummy force. In the second phase, the main army led by Sima Yi crossed the river to the northern side. Then the next thing his men realised, Sima Yi commanded the boats to be burnt and barricades to be built around the bank. By right, the enemy should be able to see the barricades being built. By wrong, they never realised the other enemy force across the river was a dummy army. Simply put, no one in his right mind would try to attack the so-called smaller army. Quite obviously, Sima Yi's generals thought their boss might have gone barking mad like a mad dog. The reason why being that Sima Yi decided to move ahead towards Xiangping instead of staying put.
Sima Yi reasoned that Gongsun Yuan was hell-bent on overpowering them. Hence, fighting a war of attrition would be what the enemy wanted [贼坚营高垒，欲以老吾兵也。攻之，正入其计]. The word 老 in this context is a euphemism for dead. In fact, the Liaodong force running out to meet them was as large as a few ten thousand strong in a bid to prevent Sima Yi's army from progressing [文懿果遣步骑数万，阻辽隧，坚壁而守，南北六七十里，以距帝].
Secondly, if he was to attack Xiangping straightaway, the Liaodong army would be alerted and stage a fightback as a result. This was due to a combination of Xiangping having only minimum security and how panic could easily result in a backlash (that's so long inner turmoil wasn't there). In this situation, the Wei army would be defeated [贼大众在此，则巢窟虚矣。我直指襄平，则人怀内惧，惧而求战，破之必矣]. Because haste was of the utmost importance for Sima Yi (i.e. 100 days to travel from the south to somewhere near Korea), it's very likely that he was, in fact, leading an army of a lesser number. Interestingly enough, Sima Yi only entered the fray in the latter half of the war. In other words, previous failures would have given him an idea of how many men Gongsun Wenyi had at his disposal.
Then came the best part of stage two: [遂整阵而过。贼见兵出其后，果邀之。帝谓诸将曰：“所以不攻其营，正欲致此，不可失也。”乃纵兵逆击，大破之，三战皆捷。贼保襄平，进军围之。]
Sneak behind the enemy, expose yourself, enemy attacks. Then you fight back in the most epic manner ever. With the river effectively becoming the Liaodong forces dead end, Sima Yi secured a crushing victory. Remember, this current army had rested enough. At the same time, a lesser quantity means better quality when it comes to war. Gongsun Yuan might have the quantity, but Sima Yi got the quality. And that's not considering the dummy army at the south blowing horns and making all sorts of noise to further destabilise the Liaodong troops. The historical text never mentioned it, but it should be tactical common sense. Really. A little wonder why Sun Quan wrote in his final (?) letter to Gongsun Yuan that Sima Yi was some sort of military god capable of unpredictable moves [初，文懿闻魏师之出也，请救于孙权。权亦出兵遥为之声援，遗文懿书曰：“司马公善用兵，变化若神，所向无前，深为弟忧之。”].
The third part would be the decisive stage. Erm, there's a problem, though.
Subordinate: Boss, we got a problem here.
Zhongda: What? Please don't tell me it's that tigress again.
Subordinate: I'm afraid it's worse than your tigress. The climate is *bleep*ing up the progress. The water level is rising and the generals are talking about moving camp.
Zhongda: Just proceed, don't slow down. If anyone makes any noise, I'll just execute them like a boss. Because I am the boss here.
Seriously, the Wei troops were in a panic. The water level was rising and you can't blame them for worrying whether progress would be halted because of the climate change. A high ranking general acted against orders, Sima Yi executed him like a boss [都督令史张静犯令，斩之，军中乃定]. And because he proved himself to be the real boss of the battlefield, everyone else had no choice but to...
There's a hiccup, though. The enemy ventured out to forage for food and fuel. Sima Yi, however, stayed his hand. His logic?
[Now, the rebels are numerous and we are few; the rebels are hungry and we are full. With flood and rain like this, we cannot employ our effort. Even if we take them, what is the use? Since I left the capital, I have not worried about the rebels attacking us, but have been afraid they might flee. Now, the rebels are almost at their extremity as regards supplies, and our encirclement of them is not yet complete. By plundering their cattle and horses or capturing their fuel-gatherers, we will be only compelling them to flee. War is an art of deception; we must be good at adapting ourselves to changing situations. Relying on their numerical superiority and helped by the rain, the rebels, hungry and distressed as they are, are not willing to give up. We must make a show of inability to put them at ease; to alarm them by taking petty advantages is not the plan at all.]
Credit: Wikipedia
However, Wikipedia failed to mention Sima Yi stating that it's never a fair deal to suffer losses for the sake of more supplies [以四击一，正令半解，犹当为之。是以不计死伤，与粮竞也].
Once the rain was over, the siege commenced once again. The pace of progress was frighteningly fast. Then again, you'd think Sima Yi wouldn't start planning in advance the organisation of resources and logistics in preparation for the siege?
Verdict and outcome:
There's no other outcome. Batman won again. Interestingly, it seemed that even the Koreans viewed Gongsun Yuan as more than just a nuisance. Unlike the Tang dynasty where Silla had to fight off the Chinese invasion, the Koreans seemed to be on friendly, if not at least friendlier terms with the Chinese. In this case, the Cao Wei faction. In fact, even the King of Korea sent help.
 |
| Erm, no. Not Claudia Kim. History has never recorded Hwang Jin-yi of doing a Xi Shi, thank you very much. |
More specifically, the King of Goguryeo sent a couple of big shots together with a few thousand men to aid Sima Yi even though he quite likely never saw Zhongda before (cue the 180 degrees moment that spooked Cao Cao to no end).
This fight had to be Sima Yi's greatest Batman moment. Gongsun Yuan's failure lies in not understanding the things to forsake in the name of the greater goal. No one was telling him to screw the national constitution. This was why abandoning Xiangping would create trouble for Sima Yi. Which of course never happened in the first place. Knowing what you have is half the battle won, but knowing what the enemy has would complete the picture. There are things which can be thrown away. For example, Claudia Kim's nukes. Then there are things which are not meant to be abandoned. For example, Max Thunder and the American troops. Seriously, you think bilateral denuking was an agenda? Go look back on when Claudia Kim flipped the table. Then you'll know what I'm talking about. And besides, nothing was said about bilateral denuking from the DPRK man when Trump first floated DMZ as a potential location for the much-hyped 12th June@SGH.
Winner:
Okay, I'm totally drained right now. I just need some sleep. But not before this song.
